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MICHIGAN "FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT"
I. Introduction: The Public's "Right to Know"
Although an informed populace is vital to the exercise of free
choice in a democracy, federal and state governments generally
have been reluctant to provide for public disclosure of govern-
ment-held information. The public itself has been lax in insisting
upon its "right to know." 1 Until recently, the public's "right to
know" would more aptly have been described as that which
remains after governmental agencies have withheld all in-
formation they thought necessary for the agencies' effective oper-
ation, or, ironically, for the public interest. The problem of gov-
ernment secrecy has received much attention, and various legisla-
tive and judicial solutions directed at reconciling the public's right
to information with the government's need for confidentiality
have been suggested. 2 Federal legislation intended to provide for
this public "right to know" had characteristically been applied by
government agencies to avoid, rather than to promote, dis-
closure. 3 Having to rely upon the discretion of each agency to
'Schultz, A Primer in the Public Information Act, 2 PUB. CONTRACT L. J. 209 (1969). See
also, Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEO. L.
REV. 18 (1967).
2The first general statutory provision for public disclosure of administrative decisions and
procedures at the federal level was the Act of June 11, 1946, Ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat.
238 codified S.V.S.C. App. § 1002 (Supp. 11, 1965-1966). Almost immediately after
its enactment, bills to improve section 3 were routinely submitted to the Congress
and were defeated. See S.2504, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955); S.2541, 84th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1958); S.2148, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957); S.4094, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958); S.186, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959); S. 1070, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959);
S.2780, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); S.1567, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S.1907,
87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961); H.R.9926, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S.3410, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S.1666, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
3Bennet, The Freedom of Information Act, Is it a Clear Public Records Law?, 34
BROOKLYN L. REV. 72, 73 (1967). Section 3 of the Administrative Procedures Act of
1945 was the major statutory excuse for withholding government information from
public view. The Attorney General's memo (U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT (1967) [hereinafter cited as Attorney General's Memo]
interpreting Section 3, noted that Congress had left each agency complete discretion
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release information, the public was handicapped by the absence
of a uniform policy favoring disclosure. 4 In an effort to establish
such a uniform policy, Congress enacted the Freedom of in-
formation Act in 1966. 5 This Act established a "general philoso-
phy of full agency disclosure" and imposed on government
agencies an affirmative duty, enforceable in the courts, to make
information readily available to the public.
A policy of public disclosure is as appropriate at the state
level as it is at the federal level. There are comparable state
agencies for almost all Federal departments concerned with com-
merce and the public health, safety and welfare. 6 Through licens-
ing and supervisory powers over businesses and individuals, state
agencies exercise extensive quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers of immediate concern to the public. The resulting rules,
records, regulations, orders and opinions serve as both the factual
findings and the substantive law of the particular area adminis-
tered by each agency. Recognizing this need for public disclosure
at the state level, the Michigan Legislature, in the Public In-
spection provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act of
1969, required public disclosure by its state agencies.
II. The Michigan Statute
A. Information to be Disclosed
The framework of the Public Inspection provisions of the
Michigan Administrative Procedures Act closely resembles its
federal counterpart. Basically, both Acts specify the types of
to decide what information concerning the agency's action was to be withheld.
Section 3 permitted the withholding of information if secrecy was required "in the
public interest," or if the records related "solely to internal management," or for
"good cause found." In addition, records were to be made available only to persons
"properly and directly concerned." See also S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
4S. REP. at 3.
55U.S.C § 552 (1967). The Act attempts to set up workable standards for determining
what records should and should not be open to public inspection. Most importantly, it
avoids such vague phrases as "good cause found" and "properly and directly con-
cerned," and replaces them with specific and limited types of information that may be
withheld (S. REP. at 5).
6
See 48 MICH. STATE BARJ. 282 (1969).
7MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 24.201-313 (Supp. 1969).
8MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 24.221-24.223 (Supp. 1969).
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information to be disclosed and provide for certain exemptions
from disclosure. The language of the Michigan act, however, is
clearer and, in several areas, more inclusive than the Federal act
in setting forth both the information to be disclosed and that
which is exempted. 9 Three general categories of agency materials
requiring disclosure are specified: (1) "final orders or decisions in
contested cases and the records on which they were made," 10 (2)
"promulgated rules,"" and (3) "other written statements which
complement or interpret law, rules, or policy, including but not
limited to guidelines, manuals and forms with instructions
adopted or used by the agency in the discharge of its functions."'
2
B. Exemptions from Disclosure
The Act's disclosure requirements are limited by the estab-
lishment of categories of materials exempt from disclosure. The
first exemption stipulates that agency regulations restricting pub-
lic access to government material supersede the agency's duty to
disclose under the Act 3 if these regulations are adopted by an
agency under a statutory grant of authority.'
4
The extent to which this exemption will affect the intent of the
9 For example, § 21(l)(a) of the Michigan act [MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.221 (!)(a) (Supp.
1969)] provides that "final orders or decisions in contested cases and the records on
which they were made," are to be disclosed, whereas the comparable Federal provi-
sion [5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)IA] is limited to "final opinions including concurring and
dissenting opinions, as well as orders made in the adjudication of cases." [Emphasis
added]. See text accompanying note 8, supra.
In the enumeration of exempt material, the Federal act does not include
non-commercial and non-financial information obtained in confidence, whereas the
Michigan statute exempts all matters obtained in confidence, regardless of their
nature. See text accompanying note 22, infra.
0 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.22 1(1)(a) (Supp. 1969).
"MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.221(l)(b) (Supp. 1969).
12MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.221(1)(c) (Supp. 1969). The wording of this provision elimi-
nates the implicition existing in the Federal act that only "statements" used as
precedent are to be disclosed. For example, letter rulings, heretofore not only unpub-
lished but also closed to public inspection, are included within the disclosure provi-
sions. Thus, the language of the Michigan act is broader than the Federal law, which
appears to be limited to statements having precedential effect. See text infra, at note
33. See also Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 761, 763 (1967), wherein Professor Davis argues against the strict ruling of the
provision approved by the Attorney General's Memo, at 16, and maintains that
agency law under the Federal statute, whether used as precedent or not, must be
published.
13
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.222(l)(a)(Supp. 1969).




Act depends upon interpretation of the agencies' regulations.
These regulations are of two types: those which are adopted to
carry out legislative mandates restricting access to certain in-
formation, and those which an agency adopts under a statutory
grant giving an agency authority to restrict access as it sees fit.
These latter discretionary regulations are arguably outside the
intended scope of the exemption inasmuch as the material is
"exempted" by the agency acting in its discretion, and not by
statute. In this regard, the Federal act, which exempts matters
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute"1 5 [Emphasis
added], is preferable, for it indicates a narrower exemption than
might be allowed under the Michigan act. The exemption may
create a loophole through which agencies could subvert the policy
of the Act by overzealously restricting access to government
material.16
To encourage agency officials to communicate frankly with
each other, inter- or intra-agency letters, memoranda, or state-
ments which would not be available to a private party in litigation
with the agency, are exempted from disclosure. 17 This exemption
may partially conflict with the disclosure provisions inasmuch as
inter- or intra-agency memoranda often contain statements which
"implement or interpret law, rules, or policy." '
In two separate but conceptually related provisions, the Mich-
igan act exempts "material the disclosure of which would con-
stitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy,"19 and "material ob-
tained in confidence from a person, matter privileged by law and
trade secrets." 20 While the former is simply a recognition of the
155 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). "This section does not apply to matters that are... specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute."
16Note, The Information Act: Judicial Enforcement of the Records Provision, 54 VA. L.
REV. 466, 468-469 (1968). Typically, these discretionary regulations place the burden
on the requestor (at least with respect to records not automatically available to the
public as part of the regular informational activities of the agencies). To this extent
they are in conflict with the policy of the Act, which places the burden on the agency.
See note 38 infra.
17MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.222 (l)(b)(Supp. 1969).
18See note 12 supra. Inasmuch as "agency" does not include legislators [MIcH. COMP.
LAWS § 24.203(2)(Supp. 1969)], correspondence between legislators and agencies is
subject to public disclosure.
19 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.222(i)(f)(Supp. 1969).
20 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.222(l)(c)(Supp. 1969).
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right of privacy as a fundamental right,21 the latter exemption is
based on the practical consideration that the vast majority of
information which the government obtains comes from the pub-
lic. 22 Confidentiality may well be necessary to preserve this
source of information. The Michigan act's exemption in this re-
gard is considerably broader than that of the Federal act, which
limits confidentiality to commercial and financial information.23
In an expansion of the Federal exemption for the regulation of
banks,24 the Michigan act exempts financial and commercial in-
formation relating to a specific regulated "person," 25 prepared by
or for use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervi-
sion of such "person." 26 The exemption is intended to protect the
financial security of banks, public utilities, and other licensed
businesses by proscribing public disclosure of their financial data.
The rationale underlying the original exemption for banks can be
found in the experience of a former day when uninsured bank
accounts and runs on banks were not uncommon. 27 To foster the
stability of financial institutions and to protect their customers,
the banks' financial data were not made available. The extension
of this limited, but nonetheless outdated, exemption is unwar-
ranted and contrary to the general policy of full disclosure.
Finally, to prevent premature disclosure, investigatory files
concerning either regulatory or law enforcement matters may be
withheld except to the extent available through discovery to a
party in litigation.28
21MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.222(l)(f)(Supp. 1969). Section 21 (2) also protects the right of
privacy by providing that "to the extent required to prevent an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it publishes or
makes available a matter required to be published and made available for public
inspection."
2 2Davis,A.B.A. Panel on Public Information Act, 20 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1967).
235 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4)(1967), "trade secrets and commercial of financial information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential."
245 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8)(1967). Matters that are "contained in or related to examination,
operating or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions."
2MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 24.205(4)(Supp. 1969). "Person" means an individual, partner-
ship, association, corporation, governmental subdivision or public or private organ-
ization of any kind other than the agency engaged in the particular processing of a
rule, declaratory ruling, or contested case.
26MICH. COMp. LAWS § 24.222(l)(d)(Supp. 1969).
2 7See Davis, supra note 12, at 80 1.28
MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 24.222(l)(e)(Supp. 1969).
May 1970]
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C. Enforcement of the Duty to Disclose
The Michigan act establishes an affirmative duty on agencies to
disclose all but the. statutorily exempt material. 29 Agency com-
pliance with this duty to disclose is sought to be assured through
two methods of enforcement.
30
First, the Act heeds one commentator's admonition that "se-
cret law should be forbidden" 31 by immunizing persons from
being "adversely affected by a matter required to be published
and made available and not so published and made available."
32
The scope of this protection depends upon the meaning given the
words "adversely affected." If this phrase is construed similarly
to the interpretation of the corresponding Federal provision,33 the
Michigan act will merely protect an individual from having an
undisclosed rule, interpretation, or policy applied against him by
the State. A broader interpretation, however, might afford greater
protection.
Consider the case of an agency which failed to disclose the
unfavorable results of tests it conducted on a particular product
found to be defective. An individual who contracted to purchase
quantities of this defective product might well argue, in a suit on
the contract, that he should be released from his contractual
obligation on the ground that he was "adversely affected" by the
failure to disclose inasmuch as he would not have entered into
the contract if he had known that the goods were defective.
Although this interpretation may seem overbroad, it is reasonable
on the face of the Act, which states that when an agency has
failed to disclose, "a person shall not in any manner.., be ad-
versely affected by" the material that was not disclosed.34 [Em-
phasis added] Moreover, the material required to be disclosed
should not be restricted by the converse application of this provi-
sion; that is, an agency should not be able to evade its duty to
disclose on the ground that no one will be adversely affected.
35
Secondly, the Act may be enforced by the circuit courts of the
2 9
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 24.221(1)(Supp. 1969).
30
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 24.223 (Supp. 1969).
3 1
See Davis, supra note 12 at 1.
32 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.223 (1)(Supp. 1969).
335 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)(E). See Attorney General's Memo, supra note 3, at 15.
34 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 24.222(l)(Supp. 1969).
35
See Davis, supra note 12 at 774.
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State, which are empowered to order the disclosure of any identi-
fiable material improperly withheld. 36 Thus, information can be
obtained from an uncooperative agency.
Ill. Evaluation
The Michigan Administrative Procedures Act,. like the Federal
Freedom of Information Act, differs in three basic ways from
previous law and agency practice in its effort to provide the public
disclosure of government information. First, any person has
standing to seek disclosure of a document regardless of whether
he has some basis for seeking the information; second, if the
document is withheld, the person desiring the material may seek
judicial review and obtain affirmative relief in a state circuit court;
third, the burden is on the agency, both upon initial request and in
court, to justify any withholding of information.
37
The provision for judicial enforcement of the Michigan act is
heavily relied upon to effectuate its policy. Its actual effect,
though, may not be as significant as that intended by its drafters.
From the public's point of view, judicial enforcement of the
Federal act has not been altogether satisfactory.
38
Ironically, the Michigan act, like the Federal act, may inhibit
the implementation of its provisions by overstating its case. The
Michigan statute either allows everyone access to the information
or allows no one such access; that is, no distinctions are made on
the basis of the individual(s) seeking the disclosure.3 9 While at-
tempting, through rejection of a "standing" test, to make in-
formation available to the public as a whole, this approach ignores
a possible situation in which information should be released to
certain parties even though that same information is not otherwise
generally discloseable. Thus, a useful addition to the Act would
36
MICH. COMP. LAWS 24.223 (2)(Supp. 1969).
37The policy underlying the public information acts and the construction of the Federal
statute make it clear that the burden is on the agency. See Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v.
Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591, 593 (D.P.R. 1967); Fellmeth, The Freedom of In-
formation Act and the Federal Trade Commission: A Study in Malfeasance, 4 HARV.
CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 345, 346 (1969); Bennet, supra note 3, at
74.
3 8Note, The Federal Freedom of information Act as an Aid to Discovery, 54 LA. L. REV.
141, 156 (1968).
3 9 0n the federal level, see Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F.
Supp. 796, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
May 19701
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be the incorporation of a provision that would allow such limited
disclosure. This could increase the likelihood of disclosure.
40
Notwithstanding the provision for judicial enforcement,
agencies may be able to effectively circumvent the policy of the
Act by engaging in lengthy administrative procedures before de-
ciding what action to take on a request for disclosure. Such
delaying tactics, which can be tantamount to outright withholding,
should not be sanctioned. 41 A significant addition to the Act
would be a provision requiring an agency to take its final action
on a request for information within a certain time period, such as
two weeks. Failure to act within the prescribed period would be
construed as a denial of the request, thus allowing the requestor
to then seek judicial enforcement. The burden imposed on the
agencies by such a requirement would be more than offset by the
resulting expeditious determination of a requestor's right to in-
formation, which is the key to the Act's policy of full agency
disclosure.
Another manner in which the policy of the Act might be better
effectuated is through the establishment of a daily distributed
state register comparable to the Federal Register. 42 Eliminating
the necessity of channelling request for information through the
particular agency would significantly reduce the possibility of
agency interference with the public's right of access to in-
formation. Furthermore, such cataloguing, indexing of rules, or-
ders and other information in a daily distributed centralized
source is more likely to present a clearer over-all statement of
current agency policy in a particular area than is the mere dupli-
cate copy of individual opinions, rules, or statements of policy
40An additional sub-section which would achieve this result might state: "The provisions
of Sec. 22(!) [relating to the exemptions from disclosure] do not apply to matters
pertaining solely to the demandant."4 1See Note, The Information: Judicial Enforcement of the Records Provision, 54 VA. L.
REV. 466, 468 (1968).
4Presently, the sole reference to the methods and procedures for actual implementation of
the Act's provisions is in Section 21(3). "The publications may be in pamphlet,
loose-leaf or other appropriate form in printed, mimeographed or other written man-
ner. Except as otherwise provided by law, the agency may charge not more than cost
for each copy of the publication." For a description of information required to be
published in the Federal Register under the Federal Freedom of Information Act, see
5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(1). It should be noted that the existence of the Federal Register
has not brought about full access to information even under a policy of full disclosure.
While the degree to which it has removed impediments to accessibility cannot be
determined, it has been of value in assisting the public exercise its "right to know."
[Vol. 3:2
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handed to an individual. Certainly the resulting convenience to
the public would enhance the practical significance of their "right
to know."
IV. Conclusion
The basic approach of the Act is to make all records presump-
tively available, placing on the agencies the burden of justifying a
refusal to disclose. This approach is both sound and preferable to
the prior situation in which the burden of rebutting a presumption
of non-availability rested on the individual.
However, the Act is deficient in that it places too much re-
liance upon judicial enforcement. This mode of enforcement in
disclosure suits often has proven to be lengthy and costly, with
the judicial decisions frequently resulting in an inadequate amount
of information being made available. Thus, the degree to which
the policy of full disclosure is effectuated will be highly dependent
upon the cooperation of the individual agencies.
For this reason, it is necessary that the present Act be supple-
mented with provisions which would operate to prevent any
agency interference with, or delay in, providing full disclosure to
the public. Only in this way will the Administrative Procedures
Act's policy of full disclosure have any practical significance.
David T. Alexander
May 1970] 449
